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Sovereign Immunity for Military
Activities on the High Seas:
Amerada Hess v. Argentine Republic
In June 1982, Argentine military aircraft attacked a neutral merchant
vessel on the high seas on three separate occasions without warning or
provocation. The incident occurred during the Falklands/Malvinas War
between the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom. The Hercules,
however, was attacked in international waters beyond the "exclusion
zones" declared by the parties to the conflict. The United States Maritime
Administration had previously notified Argentina and the United Kingdom
of U.S. interest ships, including the Hercules, that would be traversing
the South Atlantic, to ensure the safety of these neutral vessels. The
crude oil tanker suffered extensive damage as a result of the attacks and
was eventually scuttled due to an undetonated bomb lodged in its hull.I
After unsuccessful attempts to obtain redress in Argentine courts, the
Liberian corporations that owned and time-chartered the Hercules (United
Carriers Inc. and Amerada Hess Shipping, respectively) sued Argentina
for damages in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York. The complaints were filed under the Alien Tort Statute,
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1. The Circuit Court accepted the plaintiffs' allegations as true because the complaints
were dismissed by the district court for lack of jurisdiction. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.
v. Argentine Republic, 638 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd, 830 F.2d 421, 423 (2d Cir.
1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1466 (1988).
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which provides original jurisdiction "of any civil action by an alien for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States. ' 2 The district court granted Argentina's motion to dismiss
the actions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA). 3 In granting this motion the court
stated that "Plaintiffs' claims undeniably fall outside of the exceptions to
blanket foreign sovereign immunity provided by the FSIA. ' 4
The district court did not decide whether Argentina would be entitled
to claim immunity under international law:
Plaintiffs next argue that foreign sovereign immunity is not absolute or req-
uisite, and that the Argentine Republic's refusal to repay the plaintiffs is so
manifest a violation of its obligations under international law that this country
has a right to refuse it immunity. Let us assume that this argument is valid as
a matter of international law. Nonetheless, that fact does not empower this
court to create an ad hoc exception to a Congressional statute in order to hear
this case. 5
The plaintiffs appealed the district court's decision to dismiss the ac-
tions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The
decision was reversed by a divided panel of the court, which held that
(1) the Alien Tort Statute gives the federal court jurisdiction to determine
claims against Argentina based on international law violations, and (2)
this jurisdiction is not preempted by the FSIA, which is not the exclusive
basis for determining the immunity of a foreign state. 6
The Alien Tort Statute was interpreted by the court of appeals as a
jurisdictional grant based on evolving standards of international law that
determine permissible defendants, actionable conduct, and the existence
of immunity. The court concluded that international law would not provide
immunity for Argentina in suits relating to the activities of its armed forces
that violated international law:
Thus we must look to modern international law to decide whether the statute
provides jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign. For example, if a current norm
of international law immunized sovereigns for behavior that, if committed by
an individual, would be a violation of international law, such an action by a
sovereign would not be a tort "committed in violation of the law of nations."
The modern view, however, is that sovereigns are not immune from suit for
their violations of international law. 7
2. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
3. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891,
codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2-4), 1391(f), 1441(d) and 1602-11 (1982).
4. Amerada Hess, 638 F. Supp. at 75.
5. Id. at 76.
6. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 421.
7. Id. at 425.
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This article discusses the court's decision with regard to Argentina's right
to claim immunity under international law for military activities on the
high seas in the course of an armed conflict. 8
I. Sovereign Immunity
Sovereign immunity is a principle of international law that determines
Argentina's right to claim immunity. The purpose of the FSIA is to codify
international law and to provide procedural guidelines for U.S. courts. 9
Assuming the district court is correct in holding that the FSIA provides
a comprehensive legislative scheme for determining immunity, the statute
is to be construed in accordance with international law whenever possi-
ble. 10 If, on the other hand, the court of appeals is correct in its inter-
pretation of the Alien Tort Statute as an independent jurisdictional grant
not subject to the standards and procedures for determining sovereign
immunity contained in the FSIA, then the question of immunity must be
determined by reference to international law. I"
International law may be ascertained by reference to treaties, state
practice as evidence of customary law, and scholarly writings. 12 While
there is no international convention on sovereign immunity, the Inter-
national Law Commission has been engaged in the process of codifying
this area of law since 1978.13 The highly regarded Special Rapporteur, Dr.
Sompong Sucharitkul, prepared several reports and proposed draft arti-
cles on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property. In 1986
the Commission provisionally adopted a set of draft articles, which were
referred to Member States for comments. 14
The principle of sovereign immunity exempts a State and its property
from the judicial jurisdiction of another State. This immunity is based on
the independence, equality, and dignity of sovereign States, as well as
8. For a discussion of the issues relating to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, see
Kirgis, Alien Tort Claims, Sovereign Immunity and International Law in U.S. Courts, 82
AM. J. INT'L L. 323 (1988).
9. Revised Section-by-Section Analysis of the FSIA, page 5, prepared by the Depart-
ment of State and submitted to Congress on January 22, 1973. See S. 771, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 3433-40 (1973).
10. MacLeod v. United States, 229 U.S. 416, 434 (1913); Murray v. The Schooner
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
11. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
12. Id.
13. The International Law Commission was created by the United Nations General
Assembly in 1947 to promote the codification and progressive development of international
law pursuant to article 13 of the United Nations Charter.
14. The draft articles are contained in the Report of the International Law Commission
to the General Assembly, 41 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 9-24, U.N. Doc. A/41/10 (1986),
reprinted in [1986] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1986/Add. I (Part 2).
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foreign relations considerations. 15 Two competing theories have influ-
enced the development of the law of sovereign immunity. The absolute
theory prevents a court from exercising jurisdiction over a foreign State
in the absence of consent. This theory may have been more persuasive
in the last century when States were primarily engaged in governmental
activity. Today, however, the restrictive theory, which limits immunity to
acts that are public or governmental in nature, has gained wide acceptance
as States have increasingly engaged in trading and commercial activities
that fall within the realm of "private" activity. 16
The basis for the immunity or nonimmunity of a State under the re-
strictive theory is discussed by Dr. Sucharitkul in the report presented
to the Commission in 1982:
The juridical basis for "non-immunity" may be described as the counterpart
of the legal basis for "State immunity." If the exercise of imperium by a State
was the basis for immunity, then the absence of connection with imperium, or
the non-exercise of sovereign power by the State, would afford the raison d'etre
for cases of "non-immunity." If it can be said that a State is immune on account
of, or because of, or in respect of its acts or activities in the exercise of its
sovereign power, or in the performance of its sovereign functions, then likewise
that immunity ceases where no such sovereign act or activity or power or
function of a State is involved or affected by the exercise or resumption or
continuation of judicial authority by the court of another State. 17
The report also discussed the standards recognized by the national
courts of various countries for determining immunity under the restrictive
theory: the dual personality of the State (political entity, ente politico,
and judicial personality, corpo morale); the dual capacity of the State
(political power, potere politico, and juristic person, persona civile); the
public or private nature of the State activities (acta jure imperii or acta
jure gestionis); and the governmental or commercial nature of the State
activities. 18 Whether a State activity is consistent with international law
has not been recognized as a criterion for ascertaining sovereign immunity.
Thus, the fact that Argentina's military aircraft attacked a neutral vessel
on the high seas, in violation of international law, does not determine
Argentina's right to claim immunity. The essential question is whether
the activities are public or governmental in nature.
While there is some disagreement concerning the exceptions to State
immunity under the restrictive theory, there is universal agreement on
the immunity of a State with regard to purely public or governmental acts.
15. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
16. Revised Section-by-Section Analysis of the FSIA, supra note 9, at 5.
17. Sucharitkul, Fourth Report on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Prop-
erty, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/357 at 26 (1982), reprinted in [1982] Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N. U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1982/Add. I.
18. Id. at 27-33.
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Based on an extensive survey of State practice, Dr. Sucharitkul concluded
that:
There is common agreement that for acts performed in the exercise of the
prerogatives de la puissance publique or "sovereign authority of the State,"
there is undisputed immunity. Beyond or around that hard core of immunity,
however, there appears to be a grey zone in which opinions and existing case-
law, and indeed legislations still vary.19
The military activities of the armed forces clearly fall within the hard
core of immunity recognized for public acts involving the sovereign au-
thority of the State. The immunity of a foreign State for the activities of
its armed forces can be traced to the development of the principle of
sovereign immunity first recognized in connection with warships.
It was therefore not surprising that the doctrine of State immunity first came
to be recognized and accepted as a proposition of law in cases involving a
"floating territory" of one State which happened to sail into the territorial or
national waters of another State, with the result that the principle of sovereign
equality could not permit the exercise of jurisdiction by the territorial sovereign
over the floating territory, which formed part of the armed forces of another,
equally sovereign State. This was actually how the basic principle of State
immunity or sovereign immunities of States in general came to be recognized
and settled as a natural outcome of international intercourse and an inevitable
principle of international law. The first concrete illustration of its application is
to be found in cases of public armed vessels or warships. 20
One of the leading cases in the development of the principle of sovereign
immunity is The Schooner Exchange decision written by Chief Justice
Marshall in 1812. As in Amerada Hess, this case involved an alleged
violation of international law-the seizure of a merchant vessel and its
commission as a national armed vessel of France pursuant to orders of
Emperor Napoleon. In discussing the immunity extended to a warship,
Chief Justice Marshall recognized the quintessential sovereign or govern-
mental character of the activities of the armed forces:
[A public armed ship] constitutes a part of the military force of her nation; acts
under the immediate and direct command of the sovereign; is employed by him
in national objects. He has many and powerful motives for preventing those
objects from being defeated by the interference of a foreign state. Such inter-
ference cannot take place without affecting his power and his dignity. 21
By the next century, the immunity extended to a public armed ship
acting as part of the armed forces of a foreign State was recognized as
an accepted principle of comity, if not international law:
19. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, supra note
14, at 35.
20. Sucharitkul, Sixth Report on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/376/Add. I at 16 (1984), reprinted in [1984] Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/376/SER.A/1984/Add. .
21. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 144 (1812).
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The well-settled rule that, under the comity existing between nations, the public
armed ship of a friendly nation, acting under the immediate and direct command
of the sovereign power, is not to be interfered with by the courts of a foreign
state, is based upon the principle that, if the courts did attempt to assume
jurisdiction over such vessel, it would require the sovereign of the nation to
which the vessel belongs to be impleaded in the court from which the process
issued, and, by common consent of nations, such situations could not arise
without interference with the power and dignity of the foreign sovereign. There-
fore the courts will not assume jurisdiction over such vessel or its officers,
while acting as such, but leave controversies arising out of the acts of the vessel,
and its officers, while acting in their official character, for settlement through
diplomatic channels.
22
Indeed the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated that it would accept
a claim of sovereign immunity, even though the State Department had
not recognized the immunity under procedures existing before the FSIA,
if "the activity in question falls within one of the categories of strictly
political or public acts about which sovereigns have traditionally been
quite sensitive. . . .[including] acts concerning the armed forces." 23
The jurisdictional immunity accorded to a foreign State for its armed
forces is codified in the FSIA, which recognizes the immunity of a foreign
State subject to enumerated exceptions. The immunity exception for pub-
lic ships extends only to maritime liens based on commercial activity,
thus preserving the immunity of public armed vessels engaged in military
activities. 24 Furthermore, the statute expressly provides immunity from
attachment or execution for State property of a military character or under
the control of a military authority that is, or is intended to be, used in
connection with a military activity.25 This approach is consistent with the
draft articles provisionally adopted by the International Law Commission. 26
Today few principles of international law enjoy greater recognition or
acceptance than the sovereign immunity of a State for the public or gov-
ernmental activities of its armed forces. 27 As Dr. Sucharitkul unequivo-
22. United States v. Thierichens, 243 F. 419, 420 (E.D. Pa. 1917).
23. Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336
F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(b)(1982).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(2). Revised Section-by-Section Analysis of the FSIA, supra
note 9, at 35-36.
26. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, supra
note 14, draft art. 6, 18, 21, 23(b).
27. See Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, arts. 8-9, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 11 (complete immunity for warships and other ships owned
or operated by a State and used only for government non-commercial service on the high
seas); Treaty on International Commercial Navigation Law, Mar. 19, 1940, art. 35, reprinted
in 37 Am. J. INT'L L. 114 (Supp. 1943) (immunity of warships or airplanes employed at the
time the claim arises in some public service outside the field of commerce); Bustamante
Code of Private International Law of 1928, art. 337, reprinted in THE INTERNATIONAL
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cally stated: "Vessels of war belong to the armed forces of the State,
adding to its military strength and might, and as such lie outside the reach
and jurisdiction of the courts of other States." 28
A foreign State is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of another
State for the activities of its armed forces even in time of war, such as
the attacks against the Hercules carried out by the Argentine Air Force
during the Falklands war:
In international law, in time of peace or even in the event of an armed conflict,
warships or men-of-war have a special status, special privileges, and admittedly
cannot be proceeded against, unless they have been decommissioned or con-
demned as lawful prizes by a prize-court, an institution which has gone out of
fashion.29
11. Amerada Hess v. Argentine Republic
The court of appeals erred in analogizing Argentina's refusal to provide
compensation for damages resulting from the attacks on the Hercules to
acts of piracy. 30 The unlawful bombing of a neutral ship on the high seas
by a military aircraft acting on government orders in the context of an
armed conflict does not constitute an act of piracy committed for private
ends. 3 1 As Ian Brownlie clearly stated:
The essential feature of the definition is that the acts must be committed for
private ends. It follows that piracy cannot be committed by warships or other
government ships, or government aircraft, except where the crew "has mutinied
and taken control of the ship or aircraft" (Article 16 [Geneva Convention]). 32
Thus, the principle of universal jurisdiction recognized for acts of piracy
would not apply to the actions of the Argentine military aircraft.
The court of appeals also erred in relying on the denial of immunity
for international law crimes:
Indeed, the sovereign immunity defense raised by Nazi war criminals at the
Nuremberg trials was rejected by the international tribunal. ("The principle of
international law, which under certain circumstances, protects the represen-
CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN STATES 69 (J. Scott ed. 1931) (immunity accorded to com-
manders of war vessels or aircraft); International Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to the Immunity of State-Owned Vessels, Apr. 10, 1926, art. 3, 176 L.N.T.S.
200 (immunity of warships and other craft owned or operated by a State and used, at the
time a cause of action arises, for governmental and non-commercial service).
28. Sixth Report on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, supra note
20, at 10.
29. Id.
30. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 424.
31. Geneva Convention on the High Seas, supra note 27, arts. 15, 16; Law of the Sea
Convention, arts. 101-102, done at Montego Bay, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. (1982): U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 62/122 (Oct. 7, 1982).
32. 1. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 244 (3d ed. 1979).
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tatives of a state, cannot be applied to acts which are condemned as criminal
by international law.") Since the sinking of a neutral vessel on the high seas
without justification violates a substantive principle of international law, no
matter who does the sinking, there is no immunity under international law in
this case. 33
It is important to differentiate between the Nuremberg trials, which con-
cerned the liability of individuals for crimes under international law, and
the controversial concept of the criminal responsibility of States. 34 The
law of international criminal responsibility of individuals does not deter-
mine Argentina's right to claim immunity in a civil action for damages
filed in the national courts of another State. Furthermore, there is reason
to question whether the sinking of a neutral vessel on the high seas in the
context of an armed conflict, while clearly a violation of customary law,
rises to the level of an international crime. 35
In rejecting Argentina's claim of sovereign immunity, the court of ap-
peals failed to distinguish between immunity from the judicial jurisdiction
of another State and immunity from international responsibility for vio-
lations of international law:
That international law currently denies immunity for violations of international
law is not surprising, when one considers that international law consists pri-
marily of rules guiding the conduct of nations. If sovereign acts were immunized
today from scrutiny under international law, the exception would nearly swallow
the rule. For example, the emerging international law prohibition of genocide
... would make little sense, even in theory, if sovereign states were not covered
by the prohibition. 36
Sovereign immunity merely provides that claims relating to the public
or governmental activities of a foreign State should not be resolved in the
national courts without the consent of the foreign State. A State should
not be required to submit its public or governmental acts to the judicial
review of another State. This jurisdictional immunity, however, applies
33. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 426 (citation omitted).
34. I. BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS, STATE RESPONSIBILITY, PART I,
at 32 (1983):
The more important and preliminary problems in international relations grow out
of the unsuitability of the present system for the imposition of criminal respon-
sibility on states. It is very doubtful if governments are prepared to accept the
notion .... However, the concept of criminal responsibility appears in the draft
articles on state responsibility adopted by the International Law Commission.
See article 19, Draft Articles on State Responsibility, provisionally adopted on first reading
by the International Law Commission, 119761 2 Y.B. INT'L LAW COMM'N (pt. 2) 73, 95-
122.
35. Geneva Convention on the High Seas, supra note 27, art. 2; Law of the Sea Con-
vention, supra note 31, arts. 87, 90; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. However,
see article 19, Draft Articles on State Responsibility, stepra note 34.
36. Amnerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 425-26.
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only to national courts and does not negate any responsibility that may
exist under international law: "Under international law, a state that has
violated a legal obligation to another state is required to terminate the
violation and, ordinarily, to make reparation, including in appropriate
circumstances restitution or compensation for loss or injury." 37 The States
concerned may pursue a resolution of the dispute on the international
level through diplomatic channels or accepted international procedures,
such as arbitration. 38
III. Conclusion
Argentina is immune from the jurisdiction of United States courts,
under accepted principles of international law, for claims relating to at-
tacks by its military aircraft on the Hercules in international waters during
an armed conflict. The broad immunities extended to warships apply
equally to military aircraft engaged in military or defense activities on the
high seas. The air force is an integral part of Argentina's armed forces.
Attacks conducted by military aircraft in the course of an armed conflict
are activities of a purely public or governmental nature involving the
sovereign or governmental authority of the State. The members of the
Argentine military who conducted the bombing of the Hercules were
presumably acting pursuant to the decisions and instructions of govern-
ment officials. This type of activity clearly falls within the undisputed
hard core of immunity that is recognized under the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity.
37. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 35, § 901. As stated by Ian Brownlie in his
discussion of sovereign immunity, "Moreover, it must be stressed that there is no immunity
from international responsibility where this exists under general international law." 1.
BROWNLIE, supra note 32, at 326.
38. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 35, § 902.
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